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Corporate Capacity and Authority of Agents under the Botswana Companies 
Act 2003 
1.0 Introduction 
The words of Professor Kahn Freund
1
in 67 years ago might still have the ring of truth in this era, 
thus, 
„Business organization is in a constant state of flux, and the law cannot hope to keep abreast of 
developments if it ascribes to its own provisions the quality of immortality. Other branches of commercial 
law …….may content themselves with setting up a stable framework and leave the function of adaptation to 
the contractual practice of the business community itself. Company law cannot afford to do this. As soon as 
the privileges of the corporate personality and limited liability have been made available to the business 
world, as soon as the handling of vast funds contributed by large and small investors has been entrusted to 
managers who are not subject to the law of loan and debt, the law must be alert to protect against the 
investor, the outside creditor, and the public itself. Company law cannot reach the stage of finality.it is in 
need of constant reform‟ 
The passage by Botswana Parliament of the new Companies Act 32 of 2003 ushered in a new 
corporate era. The Act repealed the 1959 Companies Act which commentators had labeled as 
having lost touch with the modern trends of corporate matters.
2
 The Bill was signed into law by the 
President on 2
nd
 September 2004 and only came into operation on the 3
rd
 July 2007. 
3
 The coming 
into operation of the Act was delayed after its passage in parliament because of the drafting of its 
regulations. The country needed foreign direct investments hence a modern regulatory framework 
favourable to investors was therefore necessary. This new Act has indeed been welcomed and 
Botswana was ranked among the top fifteen foreign direct investment targets in Africa as of May 
                                                          
1
 O Kahn Freud, ‘company law reform’ (1946)9 MLR,235@235  
2
 Kiggundu, ‘company law reform in Botswana; The agenda for the twenty first century’ (1996)117 SALJ 508. 
Professor Kiggundu also argued in the article that the Act needed a complete overhaul and that a piecemeal 
approach was not sufficient. He further outlined the areas in Botswana’s company law that needed reform. 
3





 The new companies Act has brought sweeping changes in the procedures involved in 
company formation and their classification. The major change which will be the focus of this paper 
relate to corporate capacity and the authority of its agents. It is important to highlight the fact that 
capacity and representation of a company are some of the vital concepts of company law as they 
define the interface with the outside world.
5
 Under the provisions of the old Act, the capacity of a 
company was limited to the activities expressly or impliedly authorised by its memorandum of 
association in the objects clause.
6
 The new act has incorporated a modern form of capacity, in 
which a company is a body corporate, with full powers which can only be limited by its 
constitution. The authority of agents of the company has also been reformed. 
1.1 Research Question 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the way in which the capacity of the company is to be 
determined and also how the law has been changed with regard to when the company acts beyond 
its capacity and where directors or other agents acts beyond their authority. Corporate capacity 
herein refers to the ability of a company to enter into a particular transaction with a third party and 
Authority on the other hand will refer „to acts by individuals who purport to take decisions on 
behalf of the company.
7
The effectiveness of the Act in addressing the capability of the company to 
contract will be critically analysed and so are the protections offered to shareholders, the company 
and in equal measure third parties dealing with the company. The paper will particularly analyse 
                                                          
4
 Mmegi online, business section Friday 11 May 2012, 1ssue: volume 29,`Botswana attracted approximately US$13,5 
billion in foreign direct investment between 2003 and 2011. See also Professor Kiggundu’s article ‘modern company 
Law for the new Millennium: The Botswana Model’ (2004) CILSA 101, where at he praised the Bill at page 130 saying, 
‘once enacted, it will ensure security of transactions, stimulate economic activity and attract further foreign 
investment. This will enhance Botswana’s competitive advantage both regionally and internationally.’ 
5
 PA Delport ‘companies Act 71 of 2008 and the Turquand rule’ 2011 (74)THRHR 132 
6
 Section 8(ii) of the Act 
7
 AJ Boyle(consultant editor), Boyle & Birds Company Law 6ed(2007)156; British Rolled Steel Products(Holdings) Ltd v 
British Steel Corporation[1985]3 All ER 52 
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the two fundamental doctrines/rules relating to corporate capacity, namely the ultra vires doctrine 
and constructive notice. The Turquand rule, agency principles and constructive notice will be 
discussed in so far as they relate to authority of agents. A comparative analysis of the provisions of 
the Act on capacity and authority will be undertaken with reference to the South African 
Companies Act of 2008. The comparison is meant to assess the competitiveness and harmonization 
of the Act with those of other countries particularly in the SADC region, to foster regional 
integration. 
1.2 Outline of the Paper 
The first chapter is a general introduction followed by chapter two on the historical background of 
company law in Botswana and the position of the law regarding corporate capacity and authority 
of agents under the old Act. Chapter three will discuss the current position of the law, followed by 
a chapter on the remedies available in the Act to protect shareholders particularly those in the 
minority and third parties and comparison will be drawn with analogous provisions in the South 
African Companies Act of 2008. Lastly the paper will conclude with some recommendations for 
improvement of corporate law in Botswana. 
1.3 Methodology 
The research in respect of this paper is library based. It will involve analyzing the provisions of the 
2003 Companies Act relating to corporate capacity and authority of agents. Textbooks and articles 
from journals and judicial decisions from comparative jurisdictions particularly those from the 
Commonwealth, will be considered in an attempt to find interpretations and applications to the 
provisions of the Act. A comparative analysis will be done with the South African Companies Act 





 and an emerging economy like Botswana. Today there is a push for continental 
and regional integration. This integration cannot be achieved without the coming together of the 
















                                                          
8
 The Southern African Development Community is a regional body founded in 1992 to foster regional integration 
among member states and ensure economic prosperity, peace and security. The 15 Member states are Angola, 
Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
9
 See G Van Niekerk, ‘Application of South African law in the Courts of Botswana’ (2004) vol 37 CILSA 312@ 326 
where the writer opines that, ‘today there is a drive for unity within continents, not only in Europe, but also in Africa. 
Transnational economic advancement, collective self-reliance, as well as social upliftment are legitimate concerns in 
Africa. These goals cannot be realized without the coming together of the laws of the region through improved forms 
of legal interaction, legal cooperation and, ultimately, legal harmonisation.’ Further see Van der Merwe, ‘Economic 
Cooperation in Southern Africa: Structures, Policies, Problems’ 1991 CILSA 386; Kliplagat “Jurisdictional Uncertainties 




2.0 Historical development of company law in Botswana 
To fully understand the present company legislation in Botswana, a brief background of the 
country‟s history is worth some discussion. Bechuanaland (the present day Botswana) was 
declared a British protectorate in 1885, following three Batswana chiefs visit to England to seek 
protection from the South African Boer encroachment.
10
 On the 10
th
 June 1891 a proclamation was 
issued by the Queen in terms of which the law then applicable in the cape colony on the day was to 
apply mutatis mutandis in Bechuanaland Protectorate.
11
under the order, the high Commissioner 
was given power to exercise on Her Majesty‟s behalf all power and jurisdiction which Her Majesty 
had, or might have had, subject only to such instructions as he might from time to time receive 
from her Majesty. According to Nsereko,
12
 the law then applicable in the British cape colony was 
Roman-Dutch law, which was a mixture of Roman-Dutch law principles brought by the Dutch 
settlers, and English law principles introduced by the British administration to govern those areas 
where Roman-Dutch law was either inadequate or non-existent. Kiggundu postulates that, 
„companies and partnerships are not indigenous to Botswana. The law governing them is part of 
the received law and is very much based on English law‟.
13
 The United Kingdom has been 
described as having `a distinguished pedigree as an exporter of legal concepts and innovations‟
14
 
and more particularly to her former colonies and Botswana is no exception in this regard. 
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See Bechuanaland Protectorate order in council of 9 May 1891 
12
DD Nsereko, constitutional Law in Botswana 1ed (2002)2. By the proclamation the Roman-Dutch law which was 
regarded as the basic law of the Cape Colony thus became the common law of Botswana and has continued to be so 
regarded till today. See also A. Aguda, ‘Legal Development in Botswana from 1885 to 1966’ (1973)5 Botswana Notes 
and Records 52-63, AJGM Sanders  ‘Constitutionalism in Botswana: A valiant attempt at Judicial activism’ (1983) 
CILSA 351 
13
 J kiggundu, company and partnership law in Botswana 1ed(2000)55  
14
 BR Cheffins `our common legal heritage: fragmentation renewal’ (1999)30 law Librarian 4-5. 
8 
 
In 1959 the colonial government enacted the Companies Proclamation
15
 and when Botswana 
gained independence in 1966, the Proclamation was adopted as the Companies Act.
16
 The 1959 
Act was based on the English Companies Act of 1948 and the Act was amended about 16 times in 
its 44 years of existence.
17
 The piecemeal amendments alluded to above were criticized by some 
commentators,
18
 who argued that a thorough overhaul of the Act was needed with a view to 
bringing a modernised Act. Cassim
19
 noted when commenting about the numerous amendments to 
the South African Companies Act of 1973 that, „this sort of patchwork and piecemeal reform has 
inevitably led to conflict in the policy and the objectives underpinning our company law regime‟ 
words which applied equally to the amendments which had been done to the Botswana‟s 1959 
Companies Act. The old Act was not only anachronistic but also inadequate because it did not 
reflect Botswana‟s current economic climate and aspirations. Most of its sections were obsolete, 
imposed time consuming company incorporation processes and proceedings, which were 
inconsistent with today‟s international economic development trends such as globalisation and 
information technology advancements. 
2.2 The Reasons for Reform 
The government of Botswana in 1999 appointed Professor Peter McKenzie as a consultant to 
review the Companies Act. The consultant produced a Report and a draft Companies Bill, which 
were accepted by the government and the Companies Bill was published in 2001.
20
 The new 
                                                          
15
 Proclamation 71, 1959 
16
 Laws of Botswana chapter 42:01 
17
 The last amendment being in 1995. See Laws of the Republic of Botswana Act 7 of 1995. 
18
Kiggundu op cit(n2)515  
19
 FHI Cassim `The companies Act 2008: An overview of a Few of its core Provisions’ (2010) MERC LJ157@157 
20
 See PD McKenzie, Final report on the Review of the Botswana Companies Act(Gaborone, 1991), see also J kiggudu, 
‘modern company Law for the New Millennium: the Botswana model’ in (2004)4 ICCLJ 101 
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Companies Act is based substantially on the New Zealand companies Act 1993.
21
 The Minister of 
Commerce and Industries, DR Margaret Nasha outlined the principles underlying the new Act, 
when introducing the Companies Bill in parliament on 9
th
 December 2003, thus, 
`….Taking into account the constraints I have alluded to and the fact that company law is central to any 
country‟s prosperity, it has become necessary to modernise our company incorporation regulatory 
framework. The modernization is primarily intended to enable us, as a country, to more competitively 
respond to challenges and opportunities in a fast changing and increasingly difficult environment in which 




The government‟s vision to bring the country to a competitive advantage by mordernising the Act 
has not been in vain, if recent reports by international reports are to be considered. Botswana has 
recently been ranked 74
th
 in global competitiveness out of 148 economies worldwide.
23
One of the 
pillars of competitiveness is said to be „institutional environment, which is determined by the legal 
and administrative framework within which, firms and government interact to generate wealth.‟
24
 
The importance of the Act in regard to the above cannot therefore be overemphasized. The 
                                                          
21
 See J Kiggundu & Havenga ‘The regulation of directors’ self-serving conduct: perspectives from Botswana and 
South Africa’ (2004) CILSA 272@274. This is understandable given the fact that the principal consultant Professor 
McKenzie is from New Zealand. 
22
 National Assembly of Botswana Hansard number 143, part 5,Nov-Dec 2003 
23
 The country has moved up five places taking fourth sport in Africa behind Mauritius, South Africa and Rwanda with 
a score of 4.13 in the 2012/2013 report. http://www.mmegi.bw, accessed on the 05/09/13. ‘The report assesses the 
ability of countries to provide high levels of prosperity to their citizens. Therefore, the global competitiveness index 
measures the set of institutions, policies, and factors that set the sustainable current and medium-term levels of 
economic prosperity’, http://en.wikipedia.org accessed on 10/09/13.   
2424
 The global competiveness report 2012-2013, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF page 3.accessed on 
10/09/13.  The country has also been described in the following terms, ‘Botswana’s democracy is strong, stable and 
rooted in the rule of law. Botswana was widely regarded as one of the more effective countries in the world in 
combating corruption……..The prize committee believes that good governance requires an environment conducive to 
peace, security and development, based on the rule of law and respect for rights. Botswana has had to address the 
challenge of advancing each in a balanced way. This has been helped by independence and integrity of its institutions 
which bodes well for further progress towards spreading wealth and opportunity across all sectors of Botswana 
society.’ Press release, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, citation of the Prize Committee of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (Oct. 
20, 2008), available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/get/2009,  
10 
 




„This bill seeks to reaffirm the value of company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits 
through aggregation of capital for productive purposes, spreading of economic risks, and taking of business 
risks. The Bill also seeks to do the following; define the relationship between directors, shareholders and 
creditors; provide basic and adaptable requirements for incorporation ,organization and operation of 
companies; encourage efficient and responsible management of companies by allowing directors wider 
discretion in matters of business judgment whilst at the same time providing protection for shareholders and 
creditors against abuse of management power; and finally provide straight forward and fair procedure for 
realizing and distributing the assets of insolvent companies.‟ 
The above words of the minister were relevant when viewed against the backdrop of the corporate 
scandals which swept the world in 2002, the collapse of big companies in Enron, WorldCom and 
Parmalat. The statement by the minister was bold enough and was meant to show that the country 
was prepared to face the challenges of globalization and would not be left behind in statutory 
innovation. As company law commentators
26
 have observed company law has a very important 
role to play in the economy and it is for this very reason that it has to be clear, certain and 
accessible. The Act has brought numerous innovations and amongst those, is the pressure it bears 
on company owners and directors to disclose shareholding structures, dividends and profits 
through its corporate governance aspect. As it has been said, disclosure is part of the heavy price 
the company has to pay to enjoy limited liability and that, „if a country does not have a reputation 
for a strong corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere.‟
27
 The need for accurate 
financial reports and the credibility of external auditors in the modern business world cannot be 
overemphasized. They are indeed an integral part of managing any company. Part 13 of the Act is 




 Cassim op cit (n16)157 
27
 Words of Arthur Levitt, quoted in King II Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa, published by Institute of 
Directors In Southern Africa @10 Para 16 
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thus dedicated to providing comprehensive rules on reporting, accounting and disclosure.
28
 These 
stringent requirements of reporting are meant for the protection of both shareholders and creditors 
against unfair dealing. The Act also strengthens the office of the Registrar of Companies
29
 for the 
effective administration of companies and simplifies the formation of a company.
30
 A company is 
no longer required to file the memorandum of association and articles as constitutive documents 
for registration. The company can choose to submit a constitution but is no requirement for 
company to have one.
31
 The Act also codifies the core legal duties of directors which is worth 
commendation as it brings simplicity and certainty in this area of our company law.
32
  
The focus of this paper is however, the changes brought about by the Act to corporate capacity and 
the authority of its agents, the issues the writer herein turns to, for a full discussion in the next 
chapter. It is however, important to discuss the position of the law under the previous Act with 
regard to both corporate capacity and authority of agents to fully appreciate the changes brought 
about the new Act. 
2.3 Corporate capacity and Authority under the 1959 Act 
                                                          
28
 Sections 189-221 of the Act 
29
 Section 10 creates a strengthened Registrar of Companies and outlines in detail his powers under section 14. The 
duties include the maintenance of a register of companies registered or deemed to be registered under the Act; 
external companies registered or deemed to be registered and dormant companies, returns for which have not been 
made for a period of five years. The Registrar also have the powers of inspection in which for purposes of 
ascertaining whether a company or an officer is complying with the Act or any subsidiary enactment made under the 
Act, he/she may, on giving 72 hours written notice to the company, call for the production of or inspect any book 
required to be kept by the company. 
30
 Section 20 simplifies the registration process by providing for the formation of both public and private companies 
with one shareholder. A public company is required to be formed with at least two directors, while a private 
company needs only one director in terms of section 21. The Act provides for three types of companies being private, 
public and close companies.  
31
 Section 37 provides that, ‘except where required by the any other Act, a company including a close company, but 
does not need to, have a constitution.’ Where a company has a constitution, the company and its directors as well as 
its shareholders have the rights, powers, duties and obligations set out in the Companies Act except to the extent 
that they are excluded or modified in accordance with the Act by the Companies constitution. Where a public 
Company does not have a constitution, the Companies Act shall be its Constitution. 
32
 Section 130 deals with the duty of directors to act in good faith and the best interest of the company, section 40 
deals with use of company information and section 143 is on disclosure of share dealing by directors. 
12 
 
Capacity of the company was generally governed by the objects clause, ultra vires rule and the 
constructive notice rule. Authority of agents to bind the company was on the other hand governed 
by the general agency principles coupled with the common-law doctrine of constructive notice and 
the Turquand rule. In this Chapter the three special rules, thus the ultra vires doctrine, constructive 
notice and the Turquand rule and their application to capacity and authority in the old dispensation 
shall be discussed. 
2.3.1 The ultra vires Doctrine 
Section 8(ii) of the Act required that the Memorandum of Association of each company state its 
objects. The objects clause specified the activities of which the company was formed to perform 
and this brought the application of the ultra vires rule into operation. Under the ultra vires doctrine 
a company was restricted from undertaking business activities that were not authorised, or 
incidental to, or consequential to its objects clause in the memorandum of association. The 
doctrine which has its origin in the common law
33
 is to the effect that a company has no capacity to 
act beyond the scope of the objects stated in its memorandum and the purported transaction so 
concluded is null and void and not ratifiable even by the unanimous consent of its members. The 
capacity of a company is also linked to the authority of its agents. If a particular act of the 
company is ultra vires, it is by necessary implication outside the authority of its directors or 
agents. Moreover, since the objects clause appeared in a public document of the company, a third 
party was in terms of the doctrine of constructive notice deemed to have knowledge of it. The 
                                                          
33
 Ashbury carriage and iron Co v Riche (1875) LR 7 653, where the House of Lords led by Lord Cains, explained it as 
follows, ‘It was the intention of the Legislature, not implied, but actually expressed, that the Corporations, should not 
enter, having regard to this Memorandum of association, into a contract of this description. The contract in my 
Judgment could not have been ratified by the unanimous assent of the whole corporation.’ 
13 
 
reasons for the doctrine as expounded in Ashbury Railway case,
34
was the protection of 
shareholders and creditors of the company. The other consequences of the doctrine were that the 
director who had acted on behalf of the company in the conclusion of an ultra vires transaction 
was liable to the company for breach of his fiduciary duty and further, that every shareholder was 
entitled to make an application to court restraining the company from entering into an ultra vires 
transactions and engaging in ultra vires activities,
35
 the so called internal consequences of the rule.  
The rigours of this doctrine were not helped by the fact that section 10 of the Act restricted the 
alteration of objects clause of the company‟s memorandum of association except under the seven 
listed instances under section 11. The protections offered to shareholders and to companies by the 
rule were substantially dealt a blow in the twentieth century by strategies of widely drafted objects 
and powers clauses.
36
 The doctrine became an unnecessary hurdle to doing business and new ways 
of protecting shareholders and creditors were devised and most countries jettisoned it or brought 
legislation to reform same. McLennan
37
 has criticized the doctrine, saying `the supposedly 
protection was illusory, and in practice, a prospective shareholder or creditor seldom, if ever, 
consulted a company‟s objects clause.‟ 
2.3.2 Constructive Notice doctrine 
Interlaced with the doctrine of ultra vires and also applicable to authority of directors is the 
common-law constructive notice doctrine, which was pronounced in the celebrated case of Ernest 
                                                          
34
Ashbury carriage and iron Co v Riche (supra). However, opinion is divided as to whether third parties can plead 
ultra vires against the company. In Bell Houses Ltd. V. City Wall Properties Ltd [1966] All ER 674, the trial judge held 
that a third party could plead ultra vires. In New Zealand the court of Appeal held in Cabaret Holdings v Meanee 
Sport and Rodeo club Inc. [1982]1 NZLR 673, that a third party can plead ultra vires. In Australia the court has held 
that a third party cannot plead ultra vires against the company because the doctrine was meant for protection of the 
company, thus in Re K.L Tractors Ltd.(in liquidation) (1961) 106 CLR 318. 
35
 Cassim op cit (16) 165 
36
 Larelle Chapple, ‘corporate Authority and dealings with officers And Agents’ monograph 2002@ 54 
37




v Nicholls in 1857,
38
 which expounded that a person dealing with a company is deemed to be fully 
acquainted with the company‟s public documents which included, its memorandum of association, 
articles of association and resolutions that were in the office of the registrar of companies. The 
effect of this doctrine is that no person can seek to enforce against a company, a transaction or 
contract which is beyond the company‟s capacity or the authority of its directors by taking refuge 
into ignorance of the limitations placed on the company‟s capacity by its objects clause or the lack 
of authority of its directors as imposed by its memorandum and articles of association respectively. 
The authority of directors in the old Act was contained in the articles of association whilst the 
memorandum governed the relationship of the company with the outside world. The memorandum 
contained the name, domicile, objects, status and capital structure of the company.
39
 In accordance 
with section 17 of the Companies Act of 1959, every company was obliged to deliver for filing 
with the Registrar of companies, copies of its memorandum, articles and special resolutions, which 
made them public documents, available for inspection by members of the public, which is the 
pinnacle of the doctrine. The doctrine was thus relevant in respect of both capacity and authority. 
This doctrine just like the ultra vires rule has fallen out of favour with time. It has been criticized 
as being harsh and outmoded
40
given the modern way of conducting business. Many countries 
reformed this harsh rule with a statutory constructive notice and Botswana was thus left behind 
with this relic rule. 
2.4 Authority of agents and the Turquand rule 
                                                          
38
 (1857)6 HL CAS 401 and was explained by Lord Heatherely in Mahony v East Holyford Mining co. in the following 
passage, ‘the memorandum and articles are open to all who are minded to have any dealings whatsoever with the 
company and those who so deal with them must be affected with notice of all that is contained in those documents., 
39
 See (n12)100 
40
 Kiggundu, ‘Company law reform in Botswana; The agenda for the twenty-first century (1996)117 SALJ 508 at 510 
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A company being an inanimate creature can only act through human intervention; however those 
acting on its behalf should have authority in order for their acts to bind it. The basis for the powers 
of company agents could either be actual or ostensible authority,
41
and that‟s what prevailed under 
the 1959 Companies Act in Botswana. The scope of authority of directors or other agents of the 
company was determined by the provisions of the memorandum of association and the articles. 
The directors could exercise on behalf of the company such powers as expressly conferred or those 
powers which are fairly incidental to the exercise of those powers.
42
 In the previous Act the power 
to delegate was only available if expressly provided for under the articles of association. 
Ostensible authority(also known as agency by estoppel) ensues „by a representation, made by the 
principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted upon by the contractor, that the agent 
has authority.‟
43
 The third party‟s constructive knowledge of the company‟s memorandum of 
association and articles was presumed to preclude him from enforcing the transaction concluded 
between him and the company in excess of the director‟s authority which subject to the possibility 
of ratification was completely void. The severe effects of the constructive notice doctrine were 
mitigated by the common law rule laid down in the leading case of Royal British Bank v 
Turquand.
44
 The Turquand rule also known as (the indoor management rule) is generally 
pronounced by saying that, `persons contracting with a company and dealing in good faith may 
assume that acts within its constitution and powers have been duly performed and are not bound to 
enquire whether acts of internal management have been regularised.‟
45
 It is generally concerned 
with the limitations on the authority of directors or other representatives of the company to 
                                                          
41
 AJ Boyle, company Law 6ed(2007) 188 
42
 C Baxter ‘ultra vires and Agency untwined’(1970) Cambridge law Journal 280 @ 282 
43
 Freeman & Lockyer [1964]2 QB 480,at 503,per Diplock LJ. 
44
 (1856)119 ER 886 
45
Dictum of Lord Simons in Morris v Kanssen 1946 AC 459 at 474 
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contract on its behalf as stipulated in its memorandum of association.
46
 The rule was developed by 
the courts to mitigate the cruel effects of the constructive notice doctrine and minimize the risk of 
unenforceability of contracts for the outsider. It had proved to be a valuable principle as it 
complemented the general law of agency to resolve the issues of authority of company 
representatives. Cassim
47
mentions that, `the Turquand rule is justified on the basis of business 
convenience. Business dealings with a company would be very difficult, if not hazardous, if third 
parties were required to inquire into the internal affairs of the company.‟ Lord Simmons echoed 
the same sentiments in the case of Morris v Kanssen
48
, where he said, `the wheels of business will 
not go smoothly round unless it may be assumed that, that is in order which appears to be in order.‟ 
The rule is only available to protect bona fide third parties who are not aware of the internal 
irregularities or did not suspect such an irregularity
49
 and is therefore not available to insiders such 
as directors and shareholders.
50
 An outsider, who had knowledge which gives him suspicion to 
inquire about the internal management of the company, cannot claim benefit of the rule.  Another 
exception to the Turquand rule under the common law is that it is not available to third parties who 





                                                          
46
 The cases decided on the basis of this rule have generally involved the following scenarios, thus, the defective 
appointment of a director, or a director continuing to act for a company after he has ceased to be a director, failure 
to hold a properly convened board meeting to authorize the company to enter into a transaction and a disregard of 
the limitations imposed on the authority of directors by the memorandum of association   
47
FHL Cassim(Managing Ed) contemporary Company Law 2ed(2012)181  
48
 Morris v kanssen supra(n26)  
49
 Mine workers union v Prinsloo 1948 (3) SA 831 (A) 
50
 Per Lord Simonds in kanseen case in regard to directors, he said, ` to admit in their favour a presumption that that 
is rightly done which they themselves have wrongly done is to encourage ignorance and careless dereliction from 
duty.’ The protection is not completely out of reach to insiders as there are instances where they can seek such as 
illustrated in the case of Hely-Huchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968]1 QB 549 
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3.0 Corporate capacity and authority of agents under the Companies Act 2003 
As alluded to above the new Act has brought some changes to corporate capacity and authority. 
The Act has specifically jettisoned some old doctrines, reformed others in an attempt to resolve the 
problems of corporate capacity and agency. Part III of the Act is dedicated to dealing with 
capacity, powers and validity of a company‟s actions. 
The Act provides that unless the constitution of the company contains a provision limiting its 
powers a company has full capacity to carry on or undertake any business or activity, do any act or 
transaction and for that purpose shall have full rights, powers and privileges, 
52
unlike in the old 
Act wherein the powers of a company were limited to its main object clause in the Memorandum 
of association. The provision fell short of granting a company as a juristic person, the full powers, 
rights and privileges of a natural person, a different move, if comparison is drawn to trends 
adopted by other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and South Africa.
53
 
Section 25(2) provides that a company may make provision in its constitution limiting its capacity, 
rights, powers and privileges. 
3.1 Consequences of limiting the company’s capacity 
                                                          
52
 Section 25(1)(a)and (b) provides that `subject to this Act , any other enactment, and the general law, a company 
has, both within and outside Botswana,- (a) full capacity to carry on or undertake any business or activity, do any act 
which it may by law do, or enter into any transaction; and (b) for the purpose of paragraph (a), full powers and 
privileges. 
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 See the Australian corporations Act 2001 under section 124(1) provides that a company has the legal capacity and 
powers of a natural person notwithstanding any restrictions or prohibitions on the exercise of its memorandum of 
association and so is section 15(I) of the Canadian Business Corporations Act which provides that a corporation has 
the capacity and subject to the Act, the rights, powers and privileges of a natural person. The South African Act in 
section 19(1)(b)provides that the company has all the powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that 
a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such power, or having any such capacity; or the company’s 





 a company is at liberty to set out its objects in its constitution which shall have the 
effect of limiting its capacity and powers to do only those activities which are stated therein, and 
any action outside the stated objects will be ultra vires and also beyond the company‟s 
representative‟s powers unless the constitution provides otherwise. Moreover, the limitations 
imposed by the constitution of the company are valid in as far as they do not conflict with the 
Act.
55
 For the convenience of discussion, the provisions of section 26 will be set out hereunder, 
thus, 
`26.  Validity of actions 
(1) If the constitution of a company sets out the objects of a company, there is deemed to be a restriction in the 
constitution on carrying on any business or activity that is not within those objects, unless the constitution 
provides otherwise 
(2) If the constitution of a company provides for any restriction on the business or activities in which the company 
may engage- 
(a) the capacity and powers of the company shall not be affected by that restriction; and 
(b) And no act of the company and no contract or other obligation entered into by the company and no transfer of 
property to or by the company is invalid by reason only that it was done in contravention of that restriction.‟ 
From the aforementioned section it is clear that despite the fact that a company can limit its 
capacity in its constitution, any acts of the company which are outside the scope of such limitation 
are not null and void. The Companies Act now provides that the restriction imposed on the 
company in its constitution would not render the contract or activity invalid as was the case in the 
old Act of 1959. Under the new Act the contract so entered into by the company remains valid and 
enforceable as between the company and all other parties to the contract. The company cannot be 
heard to say that the contract is beyond its powers or those of its directors hence unenforceable 
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 Section 25(2)  
55
 Section 42(1) provides that the constitution of a company has no effect to the extent that it contravenes, or is 
inconsistent with this Act. 
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against the company. The provisions of section 26 thus partially abolish the doctrine of ultra vires, 
which is the external consequence which rendered actions of the company null and void because 
there were beyond its capacity. The internal consequence of the doctrine is preserved by the Act 
thus, the company is entitled to sue each director who exceeded his/her authority by entering into 
the contract for breach of his/her fiduciary duty and the shareholders rights to bring an action 
against the company restraining it from doing anything which contravene its constitution.
56
 The 
right to bring a restraining action against the company is also extended to an “entitled person”
57
 
which is a new concept in company law in Botswana.  It is also easy for the company to alter or 
revoke its constitution
58
 unlike under the old Act wherein alteration of the objects was restricted to 
the seven specified instances under section 11(1) (b). 
59
  The Act does not provide for the 
ratification of an ultra vires transaction by the company, it does however provide for ratification
60
 
of powers exercised by directors or the board of the company which power is vested on 
shareholders or any other person. The ratification or approval by the shareholders or the other 
person of the unlawfully exercised power by the director or board in question, is deemed to be, and 
always to have been, a proper and valid exercise of that power,
61
 thus it has a retrospective effect. 
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 Section 26(3)provides that subsection (2) does not limit the – (a) section 165, relating to interdicts to restrain 
conduct by a company that would contravene its constitution; (b) section 166 relating to derivative actions by 
directors and shareholders; (c) section 170 relating to actions by shareholders of a company against the directors 
57
 Defined under section 2 as a shareholder or a person upon whom the constitution confers any of the rights and 
powers of a shareholder. 
58
  Under Section 43(2) the shareholders may by a special resolution alter or revoke its constitution and equally 
shareholders of a company which does not have a constitution may by special resolution adopt a constitution for the 
company. 
59
 Under section 11(1)(b) of the old Act the company could only alter the provisions relating to the objects of the 
company in the following instances thus, to carry on its business more economically or more efficiently, to attain its 
main purpose by new or improved means, to enlarge or change the local area of its operations,  to carry on some 
business which under existing circumstances may conveniently or advantageously be combined with the business of 
the company, to restrict or abandon any of the objects specified in the memorandum, to sell or dispose  of the whole 
or any part of the undertakings of the company, or to amalgamate with any other company or body of persons.   
60
  Section 176(1) provides that, ‘the purported exercise by a director or the board of a company of a power vested in 
the shareholders or any other person maybe ratified or approved by those shareholders or that person in the same 
manner in which the power may be exercised.’ 
61
 Section 176(2) 
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It is however submitted that the power of shareholders under the common law to ratify by special 
resolution actions by directors which are inconsistent with a limitation imposed by the constitution 
has not been abolished by the Companies Act of 2003. This view is based on the presumption in 
our law that a statute is not to be taken to alter the general law unless it uses words which point 
unmistakably to that conclusion.
62
    
 In contrast the South African Act expressly provides that shareholders may by special resolution 
ratify
63
any action of the company or that of directors that are inconsistent with any limitation, 
restriction or qualification imposed by the memorandum of Incorporation and such shall have 
retrospective effect; however an action in contravention of the Companies Act cannot be ratified.
64
 
The South African Act also protects bona fide third parties who obtain the rights in good faith and 
without actual knowledge of the particular limit, restriction or qualification imposed in the 
capacity of the company or the authority of its agents by giving them the right to claim for 
damages.
65
 This section is laudable in that it seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the 
company and the rights of third parties under a transaction which is not consistent with the 
memorandum of the company.
66
 A company can thus avoid the complexities of the internal 
consequences of the ultra vires rule as per section 26 by simply not limiting its powers or those of 
the directors in its constitution. The ultra vires rule, still remain (despite the reforms which were 
long overdue) an important part of our law for the protection of both shareholders and creditors. 
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 See EK Quansah Introduction to the Botswana Legal System 1ed(1993)58, see also the persuasive South African 
decision of Casserley v Stubbs 1916 TPD 310 at 312, where Wessels J said ‘it is a well-known canon of construction 
that we cannot  infer that a statute intends to alter the common law. The statute must either explicitly say that it is 
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 Section 20(2) 
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 Section 20(3) 
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The Act has brought new remedies to further protect shareholders, particularly the minority 
shareholders, which shall be a subject of chapter four of this paper. 
3.2 The Act and the doctrine of Constructive notice 
The doctrine of constructive notice has been expressly abolished
67
 by the Companies Act of 2003. 
Third parties dealing with the company are no longer presumed to be aware of the limitations on 
the company‟s capacity or director‟s authority solely because the company‟s public documents are 
available for inspection at the Registrar of Companies office. This simply means that a company 
can no longer rely on any limitation on its powers or limitation of authority imposed on the agents 
of the company by the constitution against an outsider or third party to seek to avoid enforcement 
of a contract or transaction on grounds that he/she should have known of such. The abandonment 







 who have done away or reformed it with some 
statutory provisions. The South African Act however creates an exception under section 19(5), 
wherein a third party is presumed to have notice and knowledge of special conditions stated in the 
company‟s memorandum of incorporation if his attention has been drawn to such by the inclusion 
of the suffix „RF‟ in the company‟s name as per section 11(3)(b). 
The minister of commerce and industry, Dr Nasha in her explanatory remarks on the bill to 
parliament, had occasion to state the following in relation to this doctrine, thus,  
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 Section 28 provides that, `no person shall be deemed to have notice or knowledge of the contents of the 
constitution of, or any other document relating to, a company by reason only of the fact that the constitution or 
document has been registered by the registrar; or it is available for inspection at the office of the company’. 
68
 Section 19(4) which provides that ‘subject to subsection (5), a person must not be regarded as having received 
notice or knowledge of the contents of any document relating to a company merely because the document- (a) has 
been filed; or (b)is accessible for inspection at an office of the company. 
69
 Section 19 of the companies Act 1993 
70
 Section 130 provides that ‘a person is not taken to have information about a company merely because the 
information is available to the public from ASIC.’ 
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`the bill also abolish the ultra vires and constructive doctrines…..with respect to constructive notice 
doctrine, the current law places the onus on third parties to have knowledge of the memorandum and 
articles of association, resolutions and notices of companies. Given today‟s world, most business activities 
are conducted through the telephone, telefax, e-mail, internet and other electronic means. It is unfair to 
expect third parties within and outside this country to examine the companies registered documents. The 
abolition of the constructive notice doctrine is therefore, intended to give greater security to third parties in 
their dealings with companies.‟
71
 
The doctrine of constructive notice had acted as a great impediment for third parties to do business 
with the company particularly in the modern times as the minister had said above. 
3.3 Authority of agents under the Act  
Section 127 places the management of the business and affairs of the company under the board of 
the company. The board is in this regard clothed with all the powers necessary for managing, 
directing and supervising the management of the business and affairs of the company subject only 
to the limitations imposed by the Act or the company‟s constitution.
72
 The board of the company is 
also given the authority to delegate one or more of its powers to a committee of directors, a 
director or employee of the company or any other person except those powers listed in the third 
schedule of the Act.
73
 The Board however, remains responsible for the exercise of the power by 
the delegate as if the power had been exercised by the board.
74
 Previously the power to delegate 
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 See note 15 
72
 Section 127(3) 
73
 Section 129.the board however cannot delegate the following powers; to issue shares under section 50; the 
consideration of the issue of shares under section 53; power relating to distributions under section 58;issue of shares 
in lieu of dividends in section 61; shareholder discounts under section 62; offers to acquire shares under section 66; 
redemption of shares at the option of the company under section 73;provision of financial assistance under section 
76; change of registered office in section 184; the manner of approving an amalgamation proposal in section 224 and 
short form of amalgamations in section 225. 
74
 Section 129(2), provides for exceptions where the board, (a) believed on reasonable grounds at all times before 
the exercise of the power that the delegate would exercise the power in conformity with the duties imposed on 
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was permitted by the articles of association and they could be no delegation without express 
authority from the articles.
75
 The principles of agency law will thus continue to operate to 
determine the authority of agents to bind the company, and so is the Turquand rule. Section 27 of 
the Act also regulates the dealings between the company and other persons by making certain 
rebuttable presumptions. The section codifies some common- law principles of agency and the 
Turquand rule. The Turquand rule which is aimed at the protection of third parties to assume that 
the company has complied with its internal formalities and procedures as laid down in the 
memorandum and articles of association unless the third party knew for a fact that these internal 
formalities and procedures had not been complied with or where he had suspected that they were 
not complied with but had deliberately and wilfully shut his eyes to the irregularity.
76
  It is a rule of 
procedural convenience for the outsider and complimented the application of agency rules in 
resolving issues of authority of company agents. Some common law rules of agency have also 
been codified as well. Section 27 of the Act is set out hereunder in extenso for the convenience of 
discussion, thus, 
`27. Dealings between company and other persons 
     (1) a company or guarantor of an obligation of a company may not assert against a person dealing with the company or 
with a person who has acquired property, rights, or interests from the company that- 
(a) This Act(in so far as it provides for matters of company meetings and internal procedure) or the 
constitution of the company has not been complied with; or 
(b) A person named as a director or secretary of the company in the most recent notice received by the 
registrar under section 155- 
(i) Is not a director or secretary of a company, 
(ii) Has not been duly appointed, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
directors of the company by this Act and the company’s constitution; (b) has monitored , by means of reasonable 
methods properly used, the exercise of the power by the delegate.  
75
 See Cartmell’s case; Re county Palatine loan & Discount Co. (1874)LR 9 CH APP 691 
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 D Davies(managing editor) companies and other business structures in South Africa 1ed (2009)42 
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(iii) Does not have authority to exercise a power which a director or secretary of a company carrying 
on business of the kind carried on by the company customarily has authority to exercise; 
(c) A person held out by the company as director , secretary, employee, or agent of the company 
(i)  has not been duly appointed, or 
(ii) does not have authority to exercise a power which a director, secretary, employee, or agent of a 
company carrying on business of the kind carried  on by the company does not customarily have 
authority to exercise, does not have authority to exercise that power; or 
      (d) a person held out by the company as a director, secretary, employee or agent of the company with 
authority to exercise a power which a director, secretary, employee, or agent of a company carrying on 
business of the kind carried on by the company does not customarily have authority to exercise, does 
not have authority to exercise that power; or 
(e) a document issued on behalf of the company by director , secretary, employee or agent of the 
company with actual or usual authority to issue the document is not valid or not genuine, unless the 
person has, or ought to have, by virtue of his position with or relationship to the company, 
knowledge of the matters referred to in any of the paragraphs (a),(b),(c),(d), or (e), as the case 
maybe, of this subsection and in that case subsection (3) applies 
(2) subsection (1) of this section applies even though a person of the kind referred to in paragraphs (b) to (e) of that 
subsection acts fraudulently or forges a document that appears to have been signed on behalf of the company, unless the 
person dealing with the company or with a person who has acquired property, rights, or interest from the company has 
actual knowledge of the fraud or forgery 
(3) where the person dealing with the company has, by virtue of his position with or relationship with the company, 
knowledge of any matters referred to in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e)of subsection (1), the company shall not be 
precluded from asserting against that person that the state of the particular matter of which that person has knowledge in 
fact accords with the knowledge of that person‟ 
The Act now does provide that a person dealing with the company is entitled to assume that the 
company has complied with the internal requirements as provided by the Act itself and/or the 
constitution of the company unless the person has, or ought by virtue of his position with or 
relationship with the company knowledge that there has been non- compliance. The above is a 
restatement of the common law Turquand rule with some modifications. The protection is lost 
where the third party knew or ought to have known, of the lack of authority or compliance thereof. 
The provision also bars the company from assenting against a third party that one of the directors, 
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employees or agents did not have authority to enter into a transaction on behalf of the company 
unless the third party knew, or ought to have known, of that lack of authority. The above provision 
is couched in the same fashion as section 18 of the New Zealand Companies Act.
77
 It is also 
apparent that just like the common law turquand rule; the statutory provision does seem not to 
protect insiders such as directors, shareholders and employees as by virtue of their position with or 
relationship with the company they ought to know of non-compliance with the internal 
requirements and formalities by the company. The provision is thus the statutory restatement of the 
common law Turquand rule, and as already alluded to with some modifications which should be 
expected of a modern Act, the modifications are discussed below. The South African Companies 
Act in section 20(7) as read with section 20(8), creates a statutory Turquand rule and 
simultaneously preserves the Turquand common law rule. I shall hereunder attempt to bring out 
the changes that had been brought about by the provisions of section 27 to the common law in 
relation to the authority of directors and the Turquand rule. 
Firstly, the statutory Turquand rule as appear in section 27(1)(a) seem to apply to preclude the 
company from asserting against third parties in instances where the internal procedures and 
formalities as laid down by the Act had not been complied with. On the strength of two South 
African cases,
78
 the common law Turquand rule does not operate to favour a third party where the 
internal formality or requirement transgressed is provided for by the Act. However the South 
African companies act 2008 provide expressly
79
 that the Turquand rule does apply to statutory 
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 Act no 105 of 1993. 
78
 Farren v Sun Service SA Photo Trip Management (Pty)Ltd 2004 (2) SA 146 and Stand 242 Hendrik Potgieter Road 
Rumimsig v Gobel NO 2011 (5) SA 1, where the court dealt with the application of the Turquand rule to section 228 
which required a resolution by a general meeting in disposing a substantial or whole of the company’s assets. The 
court held that a third party could not assume that a disposal by a company under section 228 had been approved 
and therefore seek the protection of the turquand rule.   
79
 Section 20(7) provides that ‘ a person dealing with a company in good faith’ other than a director , prescribed 
officer or shareholder of the company, is entitled to presume that the company, in making any decision in the 
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requirements. This is particularly relevant in relation to section 128(1) the Botswana Companies 
Act which provides that a company shall not enter into a major transaction or make a substantial 
gift
80
 unless the same has been sanctioned by a special resolution.
81
  A “major transaction” is one 
involving the purchase or disposition of assets which are more than half the of the company‟s 
assets.
82
 The application of the Turquand rule in this case to protect third parties at the expense of 
shareholders is not particularly helpful to Botswana as a developing economy with a sizeable 
proportion of the population being illiterate. As Lewis JA eloquently explained, „it would be cold 
comfort to a shareholder, when the company loses its substratum to be told to sue the directors 
who have acted without approval.‟
83
 The drafters of the Act have succumbed to one of the dangers 
of borrowing from other jurisdictions, thus, slavish coping, which ignores the level of economic 
development and historical context of the country.  
Secondly, the common-law Turquand rule does not apply to forgeries,
84
 however, under the 
statutory innovation; the rule is extended to cover forgeries and acts of fraud, unless the third party 
had actual knowledge of the forgery or fraud.
85
  Under the statutory Turquand rule a third party 
can rely on a forged document or acts of fraud which induced him /her to enter into a transaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
exercise of its powers, has complied with all of the formal and procedural requirements in terms of this Act, its 
memorandum of incorporation and the rules of the company unless, in the circumstances, the person knew or 
reasonably ought to have known of any failure by the company to comply with any such requirement.’ 
80
 Substantial gift is defined under section 128(2) as ‘the making by a company voluntary contributions to any 
charitable or other fund, other than a pension fund for the benefit of employees of the company or a related 
corporation, of any amounts which, in any financial year, will in the aggregate exceed P100, 000, or two per cent of 
the net profits of the company for the last preceding financial year, whichever is the lesser.’ 
81
 Major transaction and substantial gift are defined under section 128(2) of the Act 
82
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84
 Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated [1906] AC 439 (HL), where Lord Loreburn opined as follows. `I cannot see upon 
what principle your lordships can hold that the defendants are liable in this action. The forged certificate is a pure 
nullity. It is quite true that persons dealing with limited liability companies are not bound to inquire into their indoor 
management, and will not be affected by irregularities of which they had no notice. But this doctrine, which is well 
established, applies only to irregularities that otherwise might affect a genuine transaction. It cannot apply to a 
forgery.’ 
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with the company. Thus a company cannot escape liability for a false document where the issuing 
director, secretary, employee, or agent was authorized to issue a true document unless the third 
party knew or ought to known of the forgery thereof.
86
 This is in stark contrast with the common-
law Turquand rule and its consequences can be far reaching because a forgery or fraud can never 
be justified under any circumstances. However, the extension of the rule to forgeries and acts of 
fraud is justified given the globalised ways of doing business, wherein it would be cumbersome for 




Thirdly, as stated by Professor Jooste,
88
` in terms of the common law, a person dealing with the 
managing director of a company can assume that authority has been delegated to the managing 
director if such delegation is possible in terms of the company‟s constitution. However,  if in terms 
of the a company‟ s constitution, authority to act on behalf of the company can be delegated to an 
ordinary director,  a third party dealing with the director cannot, generally, relying on the turquand 
rule, assume that the internal requirement of delegation has taken place.‟ 
In reading of section 27(1)(c) of the Act, one is led to conclude that, a third party in the instance 
mentioned by Professor Jooste above, will be entitled to seek protection under the Turquand rule. 
This view is strengthened by section 129 which provides that subject to the restrictions in the 
company‟s constitution the board may delegate to a director of the company or more so any other 
person, any or more of its powers except those specifically excluded.  
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87
 T Cain in his article, ‘The rule in British Bank v Turquand in 1989’ (1989)1 Bond Law Review 272@ 274, justified a 
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Turquand rule’ (2013)113(3)SALJ 464@470 
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Section 27(b) cited above appears to give protection to outsiders dealing with a director or 
secretary of the company who has not been validly appointed. A third party is entitled to deal with 
a director or secretary and such dealings are valid, if the names of the director or secretary have 
been published as such in the recent notice received by the Registrar.
89
 The Company is bound by 
the notification and is estopped from denying liability, as the third party is entitled to rely on the 
statement of fact. In this respect it is necessary that the third party should have inspected the 
notification in order to seek reliance. The third party will only lose protection if he knew or ought 
to have known of the invalid appointment. Section 27(b) not only states the common law position, 
that protection of a person dealing with the company under the indoor management rule is not 
affected merely because the director or secretary has not been properly appointed, but also avoids 
the decision of the House of Lords in Morris v Kanssen,
90
 which validated the acts of a person 
where there was a defective appointment of him as a director, but said it did not apply where there 
was no appointment at all. This section is further buttressed by section 154 which provides that the 
acts of a director are valid notwithstanding his defective appointment or lack of qualification 
thereof.  
The Act also codifies the common law principle of ostensible authority or agency by estoppel,
91
 as 
enunciated in the case of Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties Ltd.
92
 In this regard, 
where a director, secretary, employee or agent of the company who has no actual or prior 
authorisation, enters into a transaction with a third party, such a transaction is binding on the 
company, if such director, secretary or employee had been held out by the company as having 
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91
 Section 27(1)(c) 
92
[1946]1 All ER 630  
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authority to conclude such a transaction.
93
 This provision is particularly important in relation to the 
position of company secretary,
94
 which is a must have for every company in terms of section 161 
except for a close company and as has been held a company secretary is no longer a mere clerk,  
but a chief administrative officer of the company.
95
 In respect of the estoppel doctrine, it is 
important to highlight the difference of its application in the South African jurisdiction, wherein it 
cannot operate to allow a contravention of a statute.
96
  
Another issue with regard to section 27, is whether or not the protection offered thereunder is 
entirely out of reach for insiders such as directors, shareholders and employees, as it provides that 
protection therein will be lost if the person „by virtue of his position with or relationship to the 
company, knowledge‟ of the non-compliance with any of the matters referred in paragraphs (a)-(e). 
The common law Turquand law does not entirely exclude protection of insiders and the decision of 
Hely-Huchinson v Brayhead Ltd
97
 is the case on point. The import of this decision is that where a 
director of a company makes a contract with the company in a capacity other than that of a director 
he/she is entitled to protection of the Turquand rule. It is submitted that to interpret section 27 as 
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totally excluding insiders from protection in instances where they are plainly “outsiders” would 
have very far reaching results on the ordinary day-today business transactions as it „would or might 
involve very often considerable inquiry before a contract could be signed as to what the respective 
position and authority was of a particular individual by whom it was proposed that a contract 
should be signed‟
98
 which is doubtful was the intention of Parliament. The New Zealand court
99
 
held (interpreting a similar provision) that, [Relationship] extends to a class of persons outside the 
insiders of the company but does not limit it to those with an ongoing relationship with the 
company. The New Zealand court rejected the view taken by the Australian courts in Lyford v 
Media Portfolio Ltd,
100
 that relationship meant “legal or non-arm‟s length connection” such as the 
relationship to the company of directors, shareholders and employees. The writer hereof supports 
the interpretation proffered by the New Zealand court.  Similar sentiments have been expressed by 
Professor Jooste
101
 in his analysis of section 20(7) of the South African companies Act which 
expressly exclude directors, shareholders and prescribed officers from the protection of the 
statutory Turquand rule. 
In summing up this part of the discussion it would do no harm in citing the dictum of Wood J  
when dealing with section 164 of the Australian corporations Act (the equivalent of section 27), 
where he stated as follows, 
`that section 164 was enacted, inter alia, to clarify and codify the indoor management rule 
,developed from the decision in Royal British Bank v Turquand ;to overcome the distinction drawn 
in Morris Kanseen…..between defective appointments and non-existent appointments; to overcome 
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the view arising out of Ruben v Great Fingall Consolidated…..that the indoor management rule 
cannot assist in the case of forgery, and to codify the rule in Howard v Patent Ivory Manufacturing 
Co…..to the effect that a third party could not take advantage of the indoor management rule if had 




The above dictum apply with equal force the reasoning behind the enactment of section 27 of the 
Botswana companies Act, which was to correct the confusion in application created by the 
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4.0 Shareholders Remedies under the Act 
This chapter is concerned with the remedies available to shareholders to protect their interest and 
that of the company in instances where the capacity of the company has been exceeded or its 
representatives acted without authority. In the 1959 Act there were few statutory remedies to 
protect shareholders and protection was largely left only to the common law. Under the common 
law a shareholder seeking to bring an action on behalf of the company was sometimes confronted 
with the rigid procedural difficulties laid down in the case of Foss v Harbottle.
103
The reform of the 
ultra vires rule and the jettisoning of the constructive notice doctrine which for a long time 
protected the interest of the company and the shareholders from abuse by the directors and the 
controlling shareholders, meant that new and effective remedies had to be introduced in the Act. 
The provision of effective statutory remedies enhances private enforcement of shareholders rights 
hence reducing reliance upon criminal sanctions, which have proved inadequate to deal with 
problems arising in companies.  The remedies available to shareholders wherein the provisions of 
the company‟s constitution or the Act have been violated appear under Part eleven of the Act and 
are discussed hereunder. 
4.1 Interdict 
A Shareholder of the company may bring an action against the company to restrain the company or 
its director from engaging in conduct that contravene its constitution or the Act.
104
 The constitution 
takes effect in law as a contract between not only the shareholders and the company, but between 
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 Section 165(5) provides that, ‘the court may on an application under this section, make an order restraining a 
company that, or a director of a company who, proposes to engage in conduct that would contravene the 
constitution of the company or this Act, from engaging in that conduct’. 
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each individual shareholder and every other. This right of shareholders to interdict the company 
arises out of contract between the company and shareholders.  Under section 165 shareholders can 
make an application to the High court to interdict the company from acting ultra vires the 
constitution where the constitution imposes a limitation on the powers of the company or the 
authority of its directors. Shareholders may also apply for an interdict where the company or the 
directors engage in a conduct prohibited by the companies Act and the right has been extended to 
entitled person,
105
 the company and a director. The court in hearing an application under section 
165(1) can make such consequential relief as it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the 
case, however the conduct complained of must not have been completed.
106
 The need for this 
remedy has become far greater than in the past since the company will now be liable on an ultra 
vires contract once it is concluded. Under the old Act it was not as important as now because an 
ultra vires transaction was null and void. The remedy has been in existence under the common law 
and now it has been codified and an order to interdict can only be made in relation to a conduct or 
course of conduct that has not been completed. 
In South Africa, shareholders have a statutory right as well to restrain the company from 
contravening any provision of the Act
107
 or restrain the company or its directors from doing 
anything which is inconsistent with any limitation, restriction or qualification of the powers of the 
company or the authority of its directors as imposed by the memorandum of incorporation.
108
 
4.2 The statutory derivative Action  
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Under the common law, it is trite law that the company is the proper plaintiff in a case for a redress 
for a wrong committed against it.
109
 The rule also known as the „proper plaintiff rule‟ underlines 
the principle of separate legal existence of a company from its members and the law allowed that, 
the will of the majority is to be identified with that of the company. The rights to enforce a wrong 
committed against a company lie only at the instance of the company because it is a legal persona 
separate from its members.  As Schreiner
110
 properly put it, „in effect the decision to bring a suit 
lies in the first instance in the hands of the directors, and in the second, in the hands of a majority 
of shareholders in a general meeting.‟ The justification for the rule has been that it limits the 
multiplicity of suits by individual shareholders and secondly that it promote shareholders 
democracy and this was succinctly stated in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co. Ltd.
111
 It 
is only in exceptional circumstances where a member or members could be given the locus standi 
to institute an action on behalf of the company.
112
 The common law derivative action was the only 
route available particularly to minority shareholders where those in control of the company were 
reluctant to launch an action for the company or where those in control were the wrongdoers hence 
blocked the institution of proceedings by the company.
113
 A shareholder seeking to bring a 
derivative action under the common law was confronted with two major hurdles; firstly, that all the 
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documents and records which he/she must rely on to prove his case are under the control of the 
directors who happen to be defendants. Secondly the shareholder is faced with the prospect of 
being saddled with heavy legal costs should he not succeed in his application, despite the fact that 
he/she was not suing on his own interest but that of the company.  
The 2003 Companies Act has ushered in a new statutory derivative action, which expressly 
abolishes
114
 the common law right of a person other than a company to bring an action on behalf of 
the company. Section 166(1) extends the right to bring proceedings in the name and on behalf of 
the company or any of its subsidiaries or to intervene in proceedings to which the company or any 
related company is party for purposes of continuing, defending or discontinuing the proceedings 
on behalf of the company or subsidiary, as the case maybe, to a shareholder, director and an 
entitled person with leave of the High court by simply serving a notice of the application for leave 
on the company or subsidiary.
115
 The company or related company may appear and be heard and 
shall inform the court whether or not it intends to bring, continue, defend or discontinue the 
proceedings, as the case may be.
116
 The modernisation of this action demonstrates the lost faith in 
shareholders democracy to protect the interest of companies in the wake of the corporate scandals 
that occurred in the turn of the 21
st
 century.  The Act further sets out the criteria to assist the court 
in exercising its discretion whether or not to grant leave to bring proceedings sought.
117
 In 
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determining whether to grant leave the court must have regard to the likelihood of the success of 
the proceedings, the costs of the proceedings in relation to the relief likely to be given, any action 
already taken by the company or the subsidiary to obtain relief and the interests of the company or 
the subsidiary in the proceedings being commenced, continued, defended, or discontinued. The 
guidelines set are to guard against vexatious and baseless applications. The statutory derivative 
action thus makes it easier for shareholders to bring directors to book in cases where they have 
exceeded their powers in acting for the company as a result of which the company suffered 
damages. The action so instituted is not for the benefit of the individual shareholder but that of the 
company, the shareholder‟s benefit from the suit is only indirect. The modern derivative action 
under section 166 gives the court the power to make an order which it deems fit in the 
circumstances of the case. Under section 168, where the application is upheld, the court may give 
directions as to the conduct of the proceedings and/or make an order requiring the company or 
directors to provide information in relation to the proceedings. This has brought the much needed 
relief to shareholders because under the common law derivative action it was difficult if not 
impossible to bring proceedings because the much needed information was in the hands of the 
directors who also happened to be defendants and discovery of documents followed the ordinary 
procedures.  
The other advantage offered by the statutory derivative action relates to payment of costs of the 
suit, wherein the court may order the whole or part of the reasonable costs of bringing or 
intervening in the proceedings be borne by the company unless it considers the same to be unjust 
and inequitable for the company to bear costs. 
118
 This is a welcome relief, for under the common 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
company or subsidiary in the proceedings being commenced, continued, defended, or discontinued as the case 
maybe. 
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law a shareholder could personally incur a heavy legal bill on his/her bid to protect the company‟s 
interest and this provision acknowledges the dictum of Lord Denning  MR in Wallersteiner v 
Moir
119
 where he said in regard to costs in derivative action, thus,  
“assuming that…..bringing the action…was a reasonable and prudent course to take in the interest of the 
company…..the company itself should be liable for the costs of the real defendants because the plaintiff was 
acting for it and not for himself. In addition, he should be himself be indemnified ….in respect of his own 
costs. It is a well-known maxim of law that he who would take the benefit of a venture if it succeeds ought 
also to bear the burden if it fails" 
The statutory derivative action in the South African Act
120
 is available to a wider class of 
applicants and its use is not limited to wrongs that are just committed by the management or 
the controllers of the company.
121
 It is available to registered shareholders or a person entitled 
to be registered as a shareholder of the company or related company, a director or prescribed 
officer of the company or a related company, or a registered trade union representing 
employees of the company or another employee representative, or a person who has been 
granted leave by the court. The common-law derivative action just like in Botswana has also 
been abolished
122
by the 2008 Act. In this respect the South African derivative action offers 
more protection than its Botswana counterpart; however in both jurisdictions the court plays a 
pivotal role in the application of this remedy. 
4.3 Action by Shareholders against Directors 
It is a well-established principle under the common law that directors owe fiduciary duties to the 
company
123
 and not to individual shareholders or the company‟s creditors. The director can be held 
personally liable to the company (but not generally to its shareholders) for his acts while 
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performing his role as director but shareholders have no direct right of action against such a 
director.  
 Under the companies Act 2003, there are some duties which a director specifically owes to 
individual shareholders of which breach will attract a personal action against the director by 
shareholders. Section 170(1) of the Act gives each individual shareholder of a company the right to 
bring an action for damages or loss against a director for breach of a duty owed to him as a 
shareholder. The Act entrusts the management of the business and affairs of the company under 
the direction and supervision of the board of directors.
124
  The duties owed by directors specifically 
to individual shareholders include, compliance with the Act or the constitution of the company by 
directors in exercising their powers,
125
the use or disclosure of confidential company information 




and disclosure of share 
dealings.
128
 Of relevance to this paper is therefore that shareholders can sue directors for causing 
the company to do anything inconsistent with its constitution, however this will only be possible 
where the actions by the director has not been ratified by a special resolution by the company. In 
proceedings instituted by a shareholder against a director(s) under section 170(1), the court may 
appoint that shareholder to represent all or some of the shareholders having the same or 
substantially the same interest in the subject matter of the action.
129
 This is meant to curtail 
opening of a floodgate of suits by each injured shareholder against the director leading to endless 
proceedings.  
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In south Africa, each shareholder has in terms of section 20(6), a claim for damages against any 
person who intentionally, fraudulently or due to gross negligence causes the company to do 
anything that is inconsistent with the Act or anything inconsistent with a limitation on the capacity 
of the company or its directors authority unless ratified by a special resolution. An action in 
contravention of the Act is however not ratifiable.
130
 It is apparent that the claim for damages by 
shareholders under the South African Act is much wider as it is not limited only to directors. In 
South Africa Shareholders can also apply to court to have a director declared a delinquent director 
or placed under probation.
131
 This is a very drastic remedy which i submit has a very deterrent 
effect and will keep directors on their toes to always act in the best interest of the company. 
4.4 Actions by shareholders against the Company 
The common law shareholder‟s personal action against the company has been codified by the 2003 
Companies Act. A shareholder now has a statutory right to bring an action against the company for 
a breach of a duty owed to him by the company.
132
 The shareholder thus brings the action in his 
capacity as member of the company and not on a representative capacity for the company. 
Pennington
133
 points out that, „the individual rights of a member arise in part from the contract 
between the company and himself which is implied on his becoming a member and in part from 
the general law.‟ A shareholders as a member of the company is does entitled to a number of rights 
which include amongst others, voting at meetings of the company on any resolution; an equal 
share in dividends authorized by the board and to an equal share in the distribution of the surplus 
assets of the company.
134
 A shareholder is also entitled to pre-emptive rights to new shares
135
 and 
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to having his name and shareholding entered in the share register.
136
 A shareholder may therefore 
bring an action against the company if any of his rights adumbrated have been infringed upon and 
the shareholder can also sue on a representative capacity under section 173 where there are 
numerous shareholders having the same or substantially the same interest in the subject matter of 
the action before court. In South Africa this remedy has not been codified, hence the common-law 
personal action by shareholders against the company is still available. There is an interesting 
provision in the South African Act, which entitles third parties to damages in instances where they 
have obtained rights from an ultra vires contract in good faith and without actual knowledge of the 
particular limit, restriction or qualification in the memorandum of Incorporation.
137
 The Botswana 
Companies Act is silent on the rights of third parties to sue hence the position of the common law 
will still apply. 
4.5 Prejudiced shareholder’s remedy 
  The Companies Act provides a remedy for a shareholder where a company‟s affairs are being, or 
have been or where there are likely to be conducted in a manner which is oppressive, unfairly 
discriminatory or prejudicial to him/her as a shareholder.
138
 The shareholder can also bring an 
application where an act or acts of the company are likely to be oppressive or unfairly 
discriminatory or prejudicial to him.  The proceedings are brought by way of an application and 
the applicant has to prove on a balance of probabilities the allegedly prejudicial or oppressive 
conduct. The remedy is also available to former shareholders and to any other entitled person. The 
statutory oppressive remedy under the 1959 companies Act
139
 was criticized for its shortcomings 
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  The court will only give relief or order in the application under section 
174(1) if it considers that it is just and equitable to do so in the circumstances of the case.
141
 The 
orders the court may make are wide and some drastic, particularly the one putting the company 
into liquidation. The other orders the court may pronounce include, requiring the company to pay 
compensation to a person, regulating the future conduct of the company‟s affairs, altering or 
adding to the company‟s constitution and directing the rectification of the records of the company. 
No order can be made against the company or any other person unless the company or that person 
is party to the proceedings in which the application is made.
142
 This remedy is laudable; in that it is 
couched in a fairly wide manner hence it is friendlier to minority shareholders.  
The relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct in South Africa is provided for under section 163 
of the Act and it has been extended to directors. The section is also couched in more simple terms 
being, „oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to, or that disregards the interests of‟ as grounds for 
application of the remedy, in similar fashion with section 241 of the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act of 1985. 
4.6 Appraisal Rights 
Provision is made under the companies Act for a dissenting shareholder to be bought out at a fair 
and reasonable price if he/she votes against a decision made by the company to alter the 
constitution in order to impose or remove a restriction on the business or activities of the company 
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or to approve amalgamation or a major transaction.
143
 In the context of this paper the relevant 
ground upon which a shareholder can seek a buy-out will be where the company has passed a 
resolution to alter the constitution in order to impose or remove a restriction on the business or 
activities of the company. This is so, because the removal or imposition of such a restriction has an 
impact on the capacity of the company. It is submitted that this option of buy-out will only be 
possible in companies having constitutional restrictions in their activities as per section 25(2) of 
the Companies Act. If the shareholder wants to be bought out he/she must give the company 
written notice within ten days after the resolution to alter the constitution or to approve an 
amalgamation or a major transaction has been passed.
144
 The company is then required within 
twenty working days, to either agree to purchase the shares
145
 or arrange for some other person to 
purchase same
146
 or apply for an exemption order under section under sections 102 or 103. The 
company can be exempted from purchasing the shares where the purchase will be 
disproportionally damaging to the company or the company cannot reasonably be required to buy 
the shares or is unjust and inequitable for the company to purchase the shares.
147
The company can 
also be exempted from purchasing the disgruntled shareholder out where it is insolvent.
148
 This 
relief is very much welcome as it gives flexibility to those who are against the new direction that 
the company might be venturing into, and avoids protraction between shareholders and the Board. 
The remedy also protects the interest of the majority by expediting corporate transactions. In south 
Africa the remedy is under section 164 and is triggered by a proposal by the company to pass a 
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special resolution for purposes of either engaging in one of the three fundamental transactions
149
 or 
to amend its memorandum of incorporation by altering the preferences, rights, limitations or other 
terms of any class of its shares in any manner materially adverse to the rights or interests of 
holders of that class of shares as contemplated in section 37(8). Although new in both of Botswana 
and the South African statutes, appraisal rights have been in existence in other Jurisdictions like 
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5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The 2003 Companies Act has abolished and simultaneously codified some common law rules 
relating to both corporate capacity and authority of a company. The provisions of the Act have 
attempted to strike a balance between the company, its shareholders and directors and third parties 
in abolishing the common law doctrines of Ultra vires and constructive notice. In this respect the 
Act has succeeded in improving business convenience and leveling the field of play between the 
company and third parties dealing with the company. The codification and modification of the 
common law Turquand rule has to some extent offered more protection to third parties at the 
expense of shareholders as discussed in chapter three and in this respect it needs to be re-looked at 
by Parliament. The Act offers more and effective remedies to shareholders than its predecessor. 
The introductions of new remedies such as the appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders as well as 
the streamlined derivative action are very much welcomed. Effective shareholders remedies 
enhance private enforcement of rights and reduce reliance on criminal sanctions.  
The Act also compares well with its South African counterpart in relation to corporate capacity and 
authority of agents. The South African Act however, offers better protection because its remedies 
are widely framed and extended to other stakeholders like employees and trade unions. In this 
modern corporate world companies are not only responsible to shareholders but to a number of 
stakeholders hence Botswana Companies Act has fallen short in this regard. In the end I agree with 
the words of Professor Kahn Freund quoted at the beginning of this paper that company law can 
never reach a stage of finality. It must be reformed constantly in order to keep abreast of 
developments and thus be relevant. Parliament as the repository of the will of the people is 
45 
 
therefore duty bound to constantly review the companies Act to realign it with the changing 
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